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REFUGEES OF THE 21st CENTURY:
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE
Jeanhee Hongt
INTRODUCTION
More than half a century after World War II, current U.S. refugee
policy remains a reflection of postwar international needs and responses.
But changes in global circumstances have created a need for a refugee
program that more accurately addresses the needs of the modem age: an
era of increasing international investment in developing countries, a con-
tinuing international waste trade, and growing industrialization. Among
the fastest-growing causes of cross-border migrations throughout the
world is environmental degradation.1
The current legal definition of "refugee" excludes those fleeing en-
vironmentally hazardous conditions caused by natural or man-made envi-
ronmental disasters. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees,2 upon which U.S. refugee law is largely modeled, emphasizes
"persecution" or a belief in such persecution by a person's own govern-
ment as the basis for refugee protection.3 This definition was established
largely in response to Cold War expectations and needs. 4 Today's refu-
gees, however, often flee their countries for reasons other than govern-
ment persecution. In particular, developing countries increasingly
confront dangerous environmental conditions due to industrial activity
and exploitation, often at the request or with the approval of their gov-
ernments. When such government actions create life-threatening circum-
stances, the most seriously affected victims of those situations should be
entitled to refugee status.
This Note focuses on two types of environmentally-induced migra-
tions: (1) those caused by immediate man-made environmental catastro-
phes, such as industrial or technological accidents, and (2) those caused
t B.A., M.A., Stanford University, 1998; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2001. Special
thanks to Professor Stephen Yale-Loehr and Carl Berglind for their valuable suggestions.
I See generally Gregory S. McCue, Environmental Refugees: Applying International
Environmental Law to Involuntary Migration, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (1993); Jes-
sica B. Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Defi-
nition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480 (1998).
2 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention].
3 Id. art. 1 A(2).
4 See KATHLEEN NEWLAND, U.S. REFUGEE POLICY: DILEMMAS AND DIRECTIONS 9
(1995).
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by long-term human activity, such as exploitation or inefficient manage-
ment of resources.5 Part I of the paper summarizes the development of
international and U.S. refugee law. Part II discusses current U.S. refugee
law - in particular the 1980 Refugee Act - and international refugee
law, as well as the controversies surrounding the interpretation and appli-
cation of the definitions of "refugee" under these laws. Part III discusses
recent examples of the two types of man-made environmental disasters
described above. Part IV assesses the reasons for recognizing victims of
environmental disasters as refugees in light of legislative history and in-
terpretive guides to international and U.S. refugee law. Part V proposes
changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and international
refugee law that would accord refugee status to persons whose lives are
threatened by man-made environmental disasters. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes by summarizing the broader implications of such a change in refu-
gee policy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEE LAW
The first international agreement to adopt a universal refugee defini-
tion was the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. 6 The proliferation of refugee problems after World War II
prompted delegates to the Convention to replace the "ad hoc agreements
adopted in relation to specific refugee situations" with "an instrument
containing a general definition of who was to be considered a refugee." 7
Nations that ratified the Convention accepted its definition of refugee but
are not required to admit those who acquire refugee status; however, they
are required to grant such refugees specific rights. 8 For example, the
Convention prohibits states from "returning refugees to territories where
they would face threats to their life or freedom due to race, religion,
5 Sudden natural calamities - such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tidal waves - are a
third major environmental cause of cross-border migrations, but these situations are beyond
the scope of this paper. For a discussion of natural calamities causing mass migrations, see
Cooper, supra note 1, at 503-07.
6 See Convention, supra note 2. The Convention defines a "refugee" as any person who
"[as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Id. art. I A(2).
7 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Office of the U.N.
High Comm'r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. Rev. 2 (1979) (reedited January 1992)
[hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] (emphasis added).
8 See John Hans Thomas, Note, Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly: The Social Context of
'Particular Social Groups' in Lwin v. INS, 1999 BYU L. REV. 799, 801 n. 13 (citing Maryellen
Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in
a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 510 n.26 (1993)).
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nationality, political opinion or membership in a social group; 9 expelling
refugees absent a showing of national security; and penalizing aliens who
entered the state illegally" if they came directly from a state "where their
lives or freedom are in jeopardy." 10
Although the United States did not sign the Convention, it later rati-
fied the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,
in effect adopting the Convention's definition of refugee.11 To comply
with the Protocol, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 198012 (Refugee
Act) which codified the Protocol's definition of refugee in section
101(a)(42) of the INA.13 The Refugee Act eliminated the requirement in
INA section 203(a)(7)(A) that the person had to flee persecution in a
Communist or Communist-dominated or Middle Eastern country. 14 It
thus brought the United States into substantial conformity with the
United Nations definition of refugee, and "removed existing geographi-
cal and ideological restrictions in its refugee admissions process in order
to insure a 'fair and workable asylum policy' without regard to an alien's
political affiliation."' 15
In the process of revising U.S. refugee law, however, Congress
eliminated INA section 203(a)(7)(B), a provision for victims of cata-
strophic natural calamities. 16 That provision had allowed conditional en-
try into the United States for "persons uprooted by catastrophic natural
calamity as defined by the President who are unable to return to
their usual place of abode."' 17 No President ever declared an event
9 The principle of non-refoulement derives from Article 33 of the Convention, and pro-
tects all refugees - even those illegally present - against return to a country "where [the
refugee's] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." David A. Martin, Reforming
Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247,
1253-57 (1990) (quoting Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(1)).
10 Thomas, supra note 8, at 801-02 n.13.
I I Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, 268. The Protocol incorporated all elements of the Convention's definition of
"refugee" except the requirement that the events giving rise to displacement have occurred
before January 1, 1951.
12 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8, 22 U.S.C.).
13 Id.
14 See Janet L. Parker, Victims of Natural Disasters in U.S. Refugee Law and Policy,
1982 MicH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD.: TRANSNAT'L LEGAL PROB. OF REFUGEES, 91, 137.
'5 Kerry Elizabeth Knobelsdorff, Note, INS v. Canas-Segovia: Keeping Politics In and
Refugees Out, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 657, 663 (1993) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S: 407, 426
n.20 (1983)).
16 See Parker, supra note 14, at 137 (citing INA § 203(a)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(7)(B) (1976) (repealed 1980)).
17 Id. at 139 (quoting INA § 203(a)(7) as amended by Act of October 3, 1965 § 3 (re-
pealed 1980)). Although physically admitted into the United States, conditional entrants were
not considered to have immigrated into the country; they were admitted only temporarily.
They therefore were not accorded the status of permanent resident aliens and did not enjoy the
2001]
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to be a "catastrophic natural calamity" within the meaning of this sec-
tion.18
Evidence suggests that legislators and the Executive may have in-
tended to keep the provision inoperative. INA section 203(a)(7)(B)
clearly focused on victims of natural, not man-made, environmental di-
sasters. In passing the 1965 amendments to the INA, Congress stated
that its purpose in adding aliens uprooted by catastrophic natural calam-
ity to the refugee category was "to provide relief in those cases where
aliens have been forced to flee their homes as a result of serious natural
disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, and in any
similar natural catastrophes."' 19 There is no documented evidence ex-
plaining why no President ever declared an event to be a catastrophic
natural calamity. However, a minority view attached to the Senate Re-
port on the 1965 amendments suggests a view that may well have been
shared by many legislators: that "the United States should render finan-
cial, technical, and material aid to areas struck by disasters, but should
not encourage migration to the United States. ''20
This view may have laid the groundwork for the 1980 repeal of
section 203(a)(7)(B). 2' An early draft of the 1980 refugee bill included
victims of catastrophic natural calamities in the definition of refugee, but
the provision was later removed.22 The omission was likely due to the
fact that the major concerns in reformulating U.S. refugee policy were
providing for political refugees and conforming with the United Nations
definition of a refugee. 23 In addition, many legislators felt strongly that
victims of natural disasters should be assisted in rebuilding their old
homes, rather than in moving to the United States. 24 Some argued that a
policy of encouraging relocation would result in a "brain drain" on a
disaster area, while others argued that emergency situations are usually
basic guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, as did members of the other six preference groups.
After two years, a conditional entrant reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), unless his or her conditional entry status had already been terminated. After INS exam-
ination, the refugee would either be deported or granted permanent resident alien status. Id. at
139-40.
18 See id. at 140.
19 Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-748, at 16 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3328, 3335).
20 Id. at 141 (citing S. REP. No. 89-748, at 54-55 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N
3328, 3349).
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. (citing January 20, 1981 telephone interview with David A. Martin, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School and former member of the U.S. De-
partment of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, where he worked on the
Refugee Act of 1980).
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short-lived and therefore do not call for relocation.25 In any case, Con-
gress acquiesced in the failure of consecutive Presidents and Attorneys
General to implement section 203(a)(7)(B) by effectuating repeal of the
statutory section. 26
Environmental events cannot be separated from the political and so-
cial situations that cause cross-border migrations. The Haitian "boat
people" of the 1990s were more than just political refugees - their dis-
placement resulted in large part from a drastic reduction in agricultural
productivity due to extreme soil erosion, which in turn was precipitated
by massive destruction of forests and other vegetation. 27 Environmental
degradation and the ensuing competition for scarce natural resources also
contributed significantly to the Zapatista rebellion in the Chiapas state of
Mexico, which led to the displacement of up to 35,000 people.28 The
causal chain also goes the other way - political strife and wars are
largely to blame for the continuing famines in Sudan. 29 Poorly-designed
and managed agricultural schemes under Soviet authorities have led to
large-scale wastage of scarce resources, salinization of the land, and con-
tamination of the food chain, making it increasingly difficult for some
populations to remain in their usual place of residence.30
Environmental causes of migration, however, merit increased inter-
national attention even apart from the political and social situations with
which they may be linked. Despite their fast-growing numbers,31 per-
sons displaced by environmental catastrophes are not included under the
Convention's definition of refugee and are only considered for interna-
tional refugee protection in an ad hoc manner.
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. REFUGEE LAW
Persons displaced from their homes by environmental causes have
no clear protections under either international or U.S. law. Two sections
25 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 89-748, at 52, 55 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328,
3349).
26 See id. at 141.
27 See ABA Standing Comm. on Envtl. Law, The Global Environment: Challenges,
Choices and Will, in 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10255, 10262 (1986).
28 See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES,
1997-98: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, 28 (1997) [hereinafter UNHCR, STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGEES].
29 See Saleheen Mohamed, WFP launches multi-million dollar appeal for Sudan,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2740814.
30 See UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 28.
31 Persons seeking refuge from environmental degradation comprise the fastest-growing
category of migrants in the world. The present estimate of such persons is 25 million; this
number is expected to double by the year 2010, and possibly to 100 million by the year 2050.
See Cooper, supra note 1, at 484-85 (1998) (citing NORMAN MYERS, CLIMATE INSTITUTE OF
WASHINGTON, D.C., ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES 150 (1995)).
2oo01
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of the INA, however, provide avenues through which such persons
should be able to seek refuge in the United States.
First, INA section 207(a) 32 provides that the number of refugees
who may be admitted annually to the United States in any fiscal year is
"such number as the President determines, before the beginning of the
fiscal year and after appropriate consultation, is justified by humanitarian
concerns or is otherwise in the national interest. ''33 The section thus
gives the President an opportunity to propose that certain persons fleeing
environmental catastrophes - provided they first meet the definition of
refugee under the Refugee Act - be admitted to the United States, if
such determination is justified on the requisite grounds. The provision
does not, however, bind the President to consider such a measure.34
Second, INA section 244A gives the Attorney General the discre-
tion to grant temporary protected status (TPS) to aliens who are present
in the United States and cannot return to their home countries due to
"extraordinary and temporary conditions" in their state. 35 This section
applies to all residents of a designated state who arrive in the United
States before a cut-off date for that country, specified by the Attorney
General. 36 The Attorney General may also grant TPS to an alien present
in the United States if the Attorney General finds that "there has been an
earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in
the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living
conditions in the area affected. '37 Temporary protected status has been
extended to nationals of only twelve countries since INA section 244A
was enacted in 1990.38 The provision only applies to those who both
have somehow entered the United States and who are nationals of one of
the twelve enumerated countries. Even for those who qualify, TPS is
effective only during the period designated by the Attorney General, and
32 INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000).
33 INA § 207(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (2000).
34 The Senate report on the Refugee Act did specify the role that Congress was to play in
the decision-making process governing the admission of refugees. According to these reports,
the "consultation" required by the Executive under this provision means "personal contact by
designated representatives of the President with members of the committees on the judiciary to
review the refugee situation or emergency refugee situation, to project the extent of possible
United States participation ... to discuss the reason for believing that the proposed admission
of refugees is in the national interest," and to provide other detailed information, such as
information on the specific refugee and his/her situation. S. RErP. No. 96-256, at 4 (1979),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 147.
35 INA § 244A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(l)(C) (1994).
36 See Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domes-
tic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 548 (1998).
37 INA § 244A(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994).
38 Martin et. al, supra note 36, at 550. Temporary protected status has been extended to
nationals of El Salvador, Liberia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Montserrat,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Burundi, and Sierra Leone. Id.
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it permits the deportation of individuals who entered after the cut-off
date, even though they would face substantially similar circumstances in
the home country as those granted protection. 39 Both sections 207(a) and
244A are broadly discretionary and offer no guarantees that a person
fleeing environmental disaster in his or her country will be admitted into
the United States.
Congress has provided little meaningful guidance to courts inter-
preting the terms of the Refugee Act other than stating that its purpose in
passing it was to comply with international refugee law which, in turn,
also offers little interpretative guidance.40 The legislative history of the
Refugee Act, however, offers some insight into its original purposes. A
1979 Senate report states that the Refugee Act "reflects one of the oldest
themes in America's history - welcoming homeless refugees to our
shores."'41 The report describes five basic objectives of the bill, includ-
ing both substantive and procedural revisions to better provide for refu-
gee needs. 42 The bill's stated purpose was "to provide a permanent and
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of
special concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and
uniform provisions for assistance to those refugees who are admitted. 43
The references to "homeless" persons and refugees "of special concern to
the United States" indicate that legislators wanted both to broaden the
humanitarian scope of U.S. refugee law and to condition these stated
39 Id. at 549.
40 See Thomas, supra note 8, at 803. See also discussion on international refugee law,
supra text accompanying notes 6-11.
41 S. REP. 96-256 at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 142.
42 The bill accomplishes five basic objectives:
First, it repeals the current immigration law's discriminatory treatment of refugees
by providing a new definition of a refugee that recognizes the plight of homeless
people all over the world, and by according refugee admissions the same immigra-
tion status given all other immigrants.
Second, it raises the annual limitation on regular refugee admissions from 17,400 to
50,000. This is accomplished without really increasing overall annual immigration
to the United States in recent years, since the parole authority has been used repeat-
edly to exceed the 17,400 limit.
Third, the bill provides an orderly but flexible procedure for meeting emergency
refugee situations and any other situations of special concern to the United States, if
the resettlement needs of the homeless people involved cannot be met within the
regular 50,000 ceiling.
Fourth, it provides for the first time the statutory requirements that Congress be
consulted before refugees are admitted, and defines and exerts congressional control
over the process.
Fifth, it provides for federal support of the refugee resettlement process - and ex-
tends coverage to all refugees entering the United States for two years for cash and
medical benefits, and longer for other programs that help the refugees normalize
their lives in their adopted communities.
Id.
43 Id. at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 147.
2001]
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humanitarian principles upon consideration of U.S. interests. Not sur-
prisingly, such language has led to considerable debate among immigra-
tion scholars and international human rights advocates - as well as
disagreement among U.S. courts - over the definition of a "refugee. 44
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (UNHCR
Handbook), 45 issued in 1979 as a guide to governments in determining
refugee status in their states, has offered some interpretive guidance to
U.S. courts. According to the UNHCR Handbook, the determination of
refugee status under the 1951 Convention consists of three parts: "inclu-
sion," "cessation," and "exclusion" clauses.46 The "inclusion" clauses
form the positive basis upon which refugee status is determined. 47 The
"cessation" and "exclusion" clauses have a negative effect - they indi-
cate, respectively, the conditions under which a refugee ceases to be a
refugee 48 and the circumstances in which a person is excluded from the
application of the 1951 Convention despite meeting the criteria of the
inclusion clauses. 49 The UNHCR Handbook further explains that refu-
44 See Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 243, 251 (1997).
45 See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 7. Numerous decisions by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals and U.S. circuit courts indicate that U.S. courts have accorded significant inter-
pretive authority to the UNHCR Handbook. See, e.g., Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521,
523 (9th Cir. 1997); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 n.5, 1240 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993); In re
Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,221 (BIA 1985).
46 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 7, at T 30.
47 See id. at V 37-53, 66-93. The elements of the "inclusion" clauses that remain in
effect today include the requirement of a "well founded fear of being persecuted" - which
consists of both a subjective and objective evaluation of such fear - with such "persecution"
being on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular
social group; and the requirement that the applicant for refugee status be "outside the country
of his nationality" (usually the nationality of his country of origin).
48 A refugee ceases to be a refugee under the 1951 Convention if:
he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his national-
ity; or
having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or
he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his
new nationality; or
he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left ... or
he can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of
the protection of the country of his nationality; ...
being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connexion
with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return
to the country of his former habitual residence; ....
Id. at I 113.
49 The UNHCR Handbook provides:
Persons otherwise having the characteristics of refugees are excluded from refugee
status if such persons are:
already receiving United Nations protection or assistance; or
not considered to be in need of international protection; or
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gees are to be distinguished from economic migrants - that is, those
who are "moved exclusively by economic considerations" to "volunta-
rily" leave their country to "take up residence elsewhere. '50 It points
out, however, that the distinction between an economic migrant and a
refugee is not always clear because economic and political circumstances
in an applicant's country of origin may often interrelate. 51
According to the UNHCR Handbook then, the 1951 Convention
was intended to extend refugee protection to persons who are 1) involun-
tarily displaced from their homelands and unable to return, 2) because of
persecution or a reasonable fear of persecution on account of race, relig-
ion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group, and 3) in need of and entitled to international protection.52 This
definition effectively excludes victims of natural disaster from the refu-
gee definition. 53 In fact, a leading study of the time, conducted at the
request of the UNHCR, explicitly stated that the Convention's definition
excludes victims of natural disasters from acquiring refugee status. 54
According to this source, the events that cause displacement must "de-
rive from the relations between the State and its nationals. '55 Thus, such
interpretive guides appear to lend support to U.S. lawmakers' hesitancy
not considered to be deserving of international protection - i.e., persons who
have committed war crimes, serious non-political crimes outside the country of
refuge prior to admission to that country as a refugee, or 'acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations.'
Id. at 1 141-63.
50 Id. at 62.
51 For example, victims of general economic measures that affect the whole population
without discrimination may also claim refugee status if their motives for departure actually
involve a political element - i.e., the individual's political opinions, rather than his objections
to the economic measures themselves, expose him to "serious consequences." Id. at 63. The
Handbook also provides that "where economic measures destroy the economic existence of a
particular section of the population (e.g., withdrawal of trading rights from . . . a specific
ethnic or religious group), the victims may according to the circumstances become refugees on
leaving the country." Id.
52 See id. at 113-63.
53 See id. at 39: "[O]nly one motive [for abandoning one's home] has been singled out
to denote a refugee. The expression 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted' - for
the reasons stated - by indicating a specific motive automatically makes all other reasons for
escape irrelevant to the definition. It rules out such persons as victims of famine or natural
disaster, unless they also have well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated."
54 JACQUES VERNANT, THE Refugee in the Post-War World 5-7 (1953). Vernant, invited
in 1951 by the UNHCR to conduct an independent and scientific survey of the refugee situa-
tion at the time, described the definition of refugee in international law as consisting of two
elements: 1) persons qualifying for refugee status must have left the territory of the state of
which they were nationals, and 2) the root-causes of a person's displacement must be of a
political nature, and "accompanied by persecution or the threat of persecution against himself
or at least against a section of the population with which he identifies himself." Id. at 4-7.
This second condition, Vernant concludes, "excludes victims of natural disasters from the defi-
nition of the refugee known to international law." Id. at 5.
55 Id. at 5.
20011
332 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10:323
to grant refugee status to persons displaced by natural environmental
disasters.
The 1967 Protocol slightly altered the refugee definition but re-
tained the core requirements of displacement, persecution on one of the
five grounds, and the need for international protection. Scholars have
argued that these requirements are both too broad and too narrow when
applied to real situations. On the one hand, the ambiguous terms of the
refugee definition raise enormous uncertainties when applied to particu-
lar cases. 56 On the other hand, these concepts are too narrow to encom-
pass the diverse circumstances and motives that may prompt refugee
flows. 57
The development of refugee law, as evidenced by legislative history
and interpretive guides, indicates that the drafters recognized natural ca-
lamities as major causes of human migrations and purposefully declined
to extend refugee status to the victims of such events. But the drafters
seem not to have considered man-made environmental disasters - at
least not on the scale that the world has seen in recent years. The legal
concepts underpinning the definition of refugee therefore must be re-
vised, or at least reinterpreted, to bring refugee law in line with the most
pressing needs of the day. Several environmental crises of the 20th cen-
tury illustrate the need to adapt international and U.S. refugee laws to
better assist the victims of these kinds of catastrophes.
III. MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS
Before considering extending refugee status to persons displaced by
man-made environmental causes, it is first necessary to determine what
constitutes an environmental disaster meriting such status. Man-made
environmental catastrophes can be broadly divided into two categories:
1) immediate environmental disasters, and 2) long-term environmental
degradation. Recent occurrences show that, under specific circum-
stances, both of these types of catastrophes merit application of refugee
protection consistent with the purposes of international and U.S. refugee
law.
56 The key to the refugee definition is "persecution" or "well-founded fear" of such per-
secution on one of the five grounds, but the definition of these terms has engendered much
controversy. See Schuck, supra note 44.
57 For example, persons who are displaced and their lives threatened by environmental
catastrophes are not considered refugees. See generally William A. Plummer, The Big Push:
Emigration in the Age of Environmental Catastrophe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 231
(1996).
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A. IMMEDIATE MAN-MADE ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS: CHERNOBYL,
BHOPAL, AND KUWAIT
On the morning of April 26, 1986, a series of explosions at a nu-
clear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine destroyed a reactor and started a pro-
tracted release of nuclear fuel and radiation into the environment,
spreading over what is now Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Russian Federa-
tion, and most of Europe. 58 The result was the worst technological disas-
ter in history. Soviet authorities remained silent, refusing to publicly
acknowledge the accident and failing to take any action in the critical
first hours after the explosion. 59 Only some thirty hours after the explo-
sion, following strong diplomatic pressure and world-wide news cover-
age, did the Soviet government issue a brief press release stating that a
nuclear accident had occurred.60 The explosions had a devastating effect
on the social and economic life of Ukraine and its neighboring countries,
but the impact of the explosions transcended national borders to become
a symbol of global disaster and a cause of common concern for the entire
world. 61
Soviet leaders naturally wanted to reveal as little as possible of the
Chernobyl accident to the outside world because, to them, the disaster
threatened the fate of their country. 62 By the 1980s, nuclear energy had
become the key expansion area of the Soviet Union's power industry.
Hence the entire economic future of the country hinged on the success of
its civil nuclear power plants.63 Years of strict communist ideology
likely planted the seeds for the disaster. The Soviet leadership empha-
sized productivity at all costs; employed secrecy at all levels to preserve
the integrity of all Soviet Party policies; and harshly suppressed any in-
formation - even if accurate and pertinent - that would undermine a
project to which the Party had committed itself.64 As a result, Soviet
industries left crucial considerations unexplored.
Thousands of people became refugees as a result of the Chernobyl
accident. 65 Unlike refugees in other emergencies, many people displaced
by Chernobyl may never be able to return to their homes because the
area continues to be contaminated by radio nuclides. 66 A decade after
58 See Ellen Bober Moynagh, The Legacy of Chernobyl: Its Significance for the Ukraine
and the World, 21 B.C. ENVTL. Avv. L. REV. 709, 715-16 (1994).
59 Cooper, supra note 1, at 514.
60 Id.
61 UN Assembly President Calls for Continued UN Involvement in Tackling Conse-
quences of Chernobyl, M2 PRESSWIRE, Apr. 27, 1998, available at 1998 WL 11308832.
62 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 514.
63 See id.
64 See Moynagh, supra note 58, at 724.
65 Cooper, supra note 1, at 518.
66 See Supra note 61.
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the accident, the 30-kilometer zone around Chernobyl remained largely
uninhabited. 67 Most of the victims of Chernobyl fled to other parts of the
Soviet Union. But they were scattered widely, and were a similar acci-
dent to occur again within the newly disbanded Soviet states, it is certain
that victims would cross national borders in search of safety. 68
The 1984 toxic leak in Bhopal, India - considered the world's
worst industrial accident69 - is another example of a sudden man-made
environmental disaster that compelled human migration. Union Carbide
India Limited (Carbide), an Indian corporation owned predominantly by
a New York corporation, 70 manufactured pesticides at the Bhopal plant
at the request of the Government of India. 71 The waste disposal system
of Carbide in Bhopal was highly suspect even before the leak. Not only
had Carbide dumped waste in open pits and solar evaporation ponds, it
also discharged toxic effluents for years into open sewage drains. 72 On
the night of December 2, 1984, forty tons of a highly toxic gas leaked
from the plant and spread quickly throughout the overpopulated areas
adjacent to the plant and into the densely occupied parts of the city. 3
More than 2,500 people died immediately, and over 200,000 fled their
homes, half of them with serious or permanent injuries.74
Four days after the incident, American lawyers in the United States
filed the first lawsuit on behalf of thousands of Indians.75 One hundred
forty-four additional actions were brought in federal courts in the United
States, all of which were joined and assigned to the Southern District of
New York.76 The consolidated action was later dismissed on the grounds
of forum non conveniens, 77 ending the litigation in the United States.
67 Cooper, supra note 1, at 516.
68 See id.
69 See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
70 50.9% of the corporation's stock was owned by the Union Carbide Corporation, a
New York corporation. ld.
71 Id.
72 See Meena Menon, Carbide's Toxic Legacy, Poisoned Water, Wastes, INTER PRESS
SERV., Sept. 9, 1999, available at 1999 WL 27373911.
73 Tim Covell, The Bhopal Disaster Litigation: It's Not Over Yet, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 279, 279 (1991).
74 McCue, supra note 1, at 163.
75 In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 844.
76 See id.
77 The court concluded that "the Indian legal system was in a far better position than the
American courts to determine the cause of the tragic event and thereby fix liability. Further,
the Indian courts have greater access to all the information needed to arrive at the amount of
the compensation to be awarded the victims." Id. at 866.
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But the litigation in India continues to date, and most of the victims still
have not received compensation. 78
More significantly, the environmental consequences continue to
plague the citizens of Bhopal and its neighboring areas, and government
cleanup of the area is slow in coming. 79 Tons of toxic chemicals and tar-
like waste residues - possibly contaminated with mercury from empty
seal pots dumped in the waste area - remain on the premises of the
Union Carbide plant, which is now the property of the government. 80 A
1996 report of the public health engineering department in Bhopal shows
that the ground water is heavily contaminated with bacteria and chemi-
cals. 8 1 The factory's solar evaporation ponds still contain waste that poi-
sons and kills cattle that drink from them.82 An estimated 10,000 people
live in the vicinity of the abandoned plant,83 all of whom remain
threatened with the deadly effects of the disaster over a decade after it
occurred. Unless the drinking water becomes potable soon, these people
will be forced to move elsewhere or die from their government's
negligence.
The burning of Kuwaiti oil wells is a third example of an immediate
man-made environmental disaster. At the end of the Persian Gulf War,
retreating Iraqi troops deliberately set the wells ablaze in Saddam Hus-
sein's last act of vindictiveness, reminding Western nations of their de-
pendence on Middle Eastern oil.84 For eight months, more than seven
hundred oil wells burned uncontrollably until a multinational coalition of
firefighters extinguished them. 85 In addition to causing immense eco-
nomic harm, these fires wreaked immeasurable destruction on the envi-
ronment and population of the region. The region's levels of mortality
from lung cancer and other respiratory and skin diseases are expected to
rise dramatically over the next ten years due to the heightened exposure
to air pollution caused by smoke clouds. 86 In addition to the air pollu-
78 Covell, supra note 73, at 279-80. Union Carbide paid $465 million to the Indian
Supreme Court through a court-approved settlement in India. But the victims of the disaster
have not yet received any of this payment. Id.
79 See Menon, supra note 72.
80 Id. ("The mercury-filled pots were part of the U.S.-based transnational's 'Sevin' pesti-
cide-manufacturing plant's chemical reactor, and crumbled from disuse. While the mercury
was scooped up, the pots were carelessly dumped .... [M]ercury is dangerously volatile and
one of the most toxic of chemicals. Long-term exposure to mercury permanently damages the
brain, kidneys and even the foetus, posing a serious threat to poor communities living around
the plant.").
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Jessica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Ku-
wait, 10 AM. U. J. Ir'L L. & POL'Y 481, 482 (1994).
85 Id. at 481.
86 See id. at 493.
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tion, the region's fresh water supplies are severely threatened, including
dozens of desalination plants that convert salt water into drinking
water.87 As the region continues to rapidly industrialize and populate,
the demand for clean water will become even more critical.88
B. LONG-TERM EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: CENTRAL
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Clear examples of migration and displacement induced by long-
term environmental degradation are found in the former Soviet states of
Central Asia.89 Much of Central Asia is affected by problems such as
soil degradation and desertification, brought about by decades of agricul-
tural exploitation, industrial pollution, and overgrazing during the Soviet
years. 90 The Soviets' monocultural agricultural system used massive
amounts of chemicals to control weed growth and to replace soil nutri-
ents, resulting in poisoning of the region's land and water.91 The most
severe degradation of the environment in Central Asia is in and around
the Aral Sea, a large lake between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. The Sovi-
ets siphoned off most of the water flowing into the sea and used it to
irrigate the area's cotton crops. 92 By the early 1980s, the lake's surface
area had been reduced by more than half, and dust from the dried-up bed
of the sea - containing large amounts of agricultural and industrial
chemicals - now travels long distances, contributing to the further pol-
lution, salinization, and desertification of the land.93
Semipalatinsk in Kazakstan is another example of man-made envi-
ronmental disaster in Central Asia. Between 1949 and 1989, the
U.S.S.R. exploded nearly 500 nuclear bombs in the area, 150 of them
above ground. 94 As the local population has become increasingly aware
of the consequences of nuclear radiation, around 160,000 people have
left the area - about half moved to other parts of Kazakstan, the remain-
der going to Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states.95 Often the
better educated and more affluent members of the population move
away, leaving behind the members of poorer and less mobile groups who
lack the social networks required to establish new homes elsewhere. 96
87 See id. at 501.
88 See id. at 501-02.
89 See UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 28. According to a re-
cent UNHCR report, in the first half of the 1990s about 270,000 people in Central Asia were
displaced due to environmental conditions, Id. at 28.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 29.
95 See id. at 28-29.
96 Id at 28.
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A third example of continued environmental exploitation is the
plunder of forests in Southeast Asia, most notably in Cambodia. Accord-
ing to scientists, foreign-aid officials, and Cambodian critics of the cur-
rent government of Hun Sen, Cambodia faces an environmental crisis
that could prove as devastating as the recently ended threat from the
Khmer Rouge, which caused widespread death and destruction during its
years in power.97 Agreements reached in the late 1980s between Hun
Sen's communist regime, the Thai military, and private entrepreneurs has
led to a spiral of conversion, corruption, and the pillaging of Cambodia's
forests for wealth. 98 The loss of forest cover in turn has led to disastrous
flooding in recent years, siltation and fish die-offs, and other conse-
quences of large scale deforestation.99 The biggest threat is to Cambo-
dia's Tonle Sap (Great Lake), described as one of the richest freshwater
fishing grounds in the world, which is silting up as a result of deforesta-
tion and could disappear within the next two decades.100 Other reports
have indicated that uncontrolled logging at current rates could destroy
Cambodia's remaining forests in the next few years. 10' Such ecological
destruction has rendered the land dangerously vulnerable to drought and
flooding, as well as erosion that fills water channels.10 2 It is also threat-
ening the livelihoods of communities, often marginalized, that depend on
the forests and lake for food, shelter, and water resources.10 3
The Cambodian government recently ordered a ban on the export of
unprocessed wood and told the military to clamp down on illegal loggers,
but enforcement is lax and the destruction continues. 104 Moreover, cer-
tain government departments and the military may be colluding to thwart
the restrictions. 105 It is clear that mining of Cambodia's forests has been
key to the power of the military and political leaders in Cambodia - not
only for the ruling governments, but also for the guerilla armies that have
challenged them.10 6 Although the exploitation of the forests in Cambo-
97 Michael Richardson, Ecology: Cambodia's Next Man-Made Disaster, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 15, 1999, available at http://www.iht.com/IHT/MR/99/mr0l1599.html.
98 See Kirk Talbott & Melissa Brown, Forest Plunder in Southeast Asia: An Environ-
mental Security Nexus in Burma and Cambodia, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY
PROJECT REP., Spring 1998, at 53-60, 54.
99 Id. at 59.
100 See Loggers Use Loophole to Decimate Cambodia's Disappearing Forests, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, May 1, 1997, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.comlarchives/54/
068.html.
101 See Michael Richardson, supra note 97.
102 See id.
103 See Talbott & Brown, supra note 98, at 59.
104 See Cambodia Could Soon Lose Forests to Illegal Loggers: Green Group, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 15, 1997, available at http://www.forests.org/recent/1997/
cambsols.htm.
105 Id.
106 See Talbott & Brown, supra note 98, at 55.
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dia has both fueled and been fueled by decades of violent political con-
flict and civil war, the environmental devastation alone could soon
render large parts of the region uninhabitable.
IV. ANALYSIS
The victims of these kinds of man-made environmental disasters
merit refugee status for several reasons. First, one reading of the
UNHCR Handbook - arguably the most authoritative interpretation of
the Convention and the Protocol - suggests that such victims may, or at
least should, merit refugee status. Under the Convention and the Proto-
col, refugees are distinguished from other migrants in that they lack the
protection of their state and therefore must rely upon the international
community for protection. 10 7 A refugee is a person who is outside of his
country because of persecution on one of the five grounds, or fear of
such persecution, and "is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country."' 10 8 The UNHCR Hand-
book explains that the term "unwilling," refers to "refugees who refuse to
accept the protection of the Government of the country," and is "quali-
fied by the phrase 'owing to such fear."'10 9 When the protection of the
country of nationality is available, and there is "no ground based on well-
founded fear for refusing it," the person does not need international pro-
tection and is not a refugee. 110 Thus, fear of persecution is a necessary
precondition of a refugee's failure to receive government protection
when that person is "unwilling" to accept such protection.
In contrast, the absence of any such qualifying language for the term
"unable" implies that such fear is not a necessary basis of a refugee's
lack of government protection when the refugee is unable to receive such
protection. According to the UNHCR Handbook, being "unable" to avail
oneself of the protection of one's government "implies circumstances
that are beyond the will of the person concerned."" 'I For example, there
107 See UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 28, at 28.
108 Convention, supra note 2, art. IA(2). This portion of the definition refers to persons
who have a nationality. The Convention also accords refugee status to certain stateless per-
sons: i.e., any person "who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence.., is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Id.
The UNHCR Handbook explains that the reasons for the change in language is that "in the
case of a stateless refugee, the question of 'availment of protection' of the country of his
former habitual residence" does not arise, and "once a stateless person has abandoned the
country of his former habitual residence for the reasons indicated in the definition, he is usu-
ally unable to return." UNHCR Handbook, supra note 7, at 1 101.
109 Id. at I 100 ("Where a person is willing to avail himself of the protection of his home
country, such willingness would normally be incompatible with a claim that he is outside that
country 'owing to well-founded fear of persecution.' ").
110 Id.
' Id. at198.
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may be a state of war or "other grave disturbance, which prevents the
country of nationality from extending protection or makes such protec-
tion ineffective."'"12 The country of nationality may also have denied
protection to the applicant." 3 A refugee's "inability" to receive protec-
tion can thus arise from two circumstances: (1) where the government
refused to extend effective protection, or (2) where the government was
incapable of extending such protection. The first situation would encom-
pass cases of state persecution. The second situation, however, suggests
that a refugee may be "unable" to avail himself from the protection of his
government even where that government is willing and attempting to do
SO.
Absence of state persecution does not necessarily mean absence of
persecution, for persecution may also come from non-government per-
sons such as guerillas, extremist groups or mobs. In such cases, one
could both be displaced due to persecution and be "unable" to avail one-
self of effective government protection if circumstances prevent the gov-
ernment from offering protection. The language of the Convention and
the Protocol suggests, however, that refugeehood can result even in the
absence of persecution - i.e., from circumstances that simply render a
government unable to extend effective protection.
But even if the drafters of the Convention and the Protocol did not
intend for refugee status to apply in the absence of persecution, the
UNHCR Handbook's recognition of "grave circumstances" rendering a
government's protection "ineffective" suggests that the refugee defini-
tion should be revised to consider environmentally hazardous circum-
stances. Given the humanitarian goals of refugee policy, it makes little
sense to extend refugee status to persons whose governments are at-
tempting to protect them while not extending refugee status to persons
whose governments create and refuse to offer protection from equally
grave circumstances, such as those caused by the Chernobyl explosion
and the years of bomb testing in central Asia. Furthermore, whichever
way the UNHCR Handbook is read, it states that "whether unable or
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his Government, a refugee
is always a person who does not enjoy such protection."' 14 Such lan-
guage emphasizes the significance of absence of state protection in the
refugee definition, regardless of its cause.
Admittedly, reinterpreting or revising the refugee definition to in-
clude all environmentally displaced persons who lack the protection of
their states would open the door to a flood of refugees far beyond what
the international community is able to manage. Such an interpretation,
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at T 97.
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therefore, would have to be limited by specific requirements, such as the
occurrence of certain threshold levels of environmental destruction in the
country of origin, and the existence of specific circumstances rendering
the applicants unable to avail themselves of their government's protec-
tion within a designated period of time.
A second argument for extending refugee status to victims of envi-
ronmental disaster is simply that extensive changes have occurred world-
wide in the conditions giving rise to mass migrations. It is clear that the
drafters of international and U.S. refugee law anticipated the extent to
which refugee needs could change in the future. The UNHCR Handbook
explains that the reason for the original 1951 cut-off date in the Conven-
tion was that "there was a desire by a number of States not to assume
obligations the extent of which could not be foreseen."' 15 Thus, in addi-
tion to the 1951 dateline, the Convention also gave contracting states the
"possibility of limiting their obligations under the Convention to persons
who had become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe."' 16
The 1967 Protocol, however, abolished the temporal and geographic lim-
itations on the refugee definition, due to the understanding that "new
refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted and that
the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the
Convention."' 17 A decade and a half after the Convention, then, the
drafters of the Protocol acknowledged the need to amend the refugee
definition, albeit only slightly, in view of changed circumstances.
The international refugee definition has remained the same since the
Protocol was adopted in 1967. After three decades, however, environ-
mental conditions have drastically changed. Rapid industrialization and
economic growth in many developing countries have come at the cost of
citizens' environmental safety.' 18 For example, "in the hopes of generat-
ing rapid economic growth, governments of developing countries will
permit industries to operate dangerous technologies in under-monitored,
under-regulated, and accordingly, more disaster-prone conditions."' ' 9
The disaster in Bhopal provides a clear example: it "occurred because the
government of India permitted the prospect of industrial growth to out-
weigh the importance of environmental risk management."'' 20 Chances
are high that another accident like that in Chernobyl will occur in the
near future, as the majority of the Soviet nuclear power plants are located
115 Id. at T 108.
116 Id.
117 Id. at annex Ill.
118 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 517 n.215.
119 Id. (citing Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction to LEARNING FROM DISASTER - RISK MAN-
AGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 5 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 1994)).
120 Id. (citing Michael R. Reich, Toxic Politics and Pollution Victims in the Third World,
in LEARNING FROM DISASTER, supra note 119, at 191).
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near densely populated areas, and the former Soviet states' reliance on
nuclear electric power is greater than ever. 121 The magnitude of these
industrial and technological developments, and their potential dangers,
could not have been foreseen at a time when such large scale industrial
and technological activities did not exist.
The legislative history of U.S. refugee law also indicates recogni-
tion of the need to have a flexible refugee program. According to a 1979
Senate report, 12 2 the Refugee Act could not explicitly define all of its
terms - in particular, what refugees are deemed to be "of special con-
cern to the United States" - for this was "an issue only the future can
define."1 23 Rather, the bill was "designed for the decades to come, and
what refugees will be deemed of special concern to the American people
will be a public policy issue that will be ... debated and reviewed con-
tinuously by Congress, the President, and the American people."' 124
These statements indicate legislative intent to establish a refugee system
that would accommodate both the changing needs of refugees and the
domestic interests of the United States.
Historical context played a definitive role in drafting the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention.125 In its final form, the Convention encompassed per-
sons who had fled, or might flee, as a result of events that had already
taken place - most significantly the Nazi persecutions of 1933-45 - as
well as "increasingly repressive communist regimes in Eastern Eu-
rope." 26 Thus, the history of the Convention itself suggests that its orig-
inal intent was to accommodate existing refugee needs. This history, and
the apparent recognition under both international and U.S. refugee law of
the need for flexibility in refugee definitions, demonstrates that amend-
ing the refugee definition to recognize today's victims of specific envi-
ronmental disasters as refugees would be consistent with the original
intent and purpose of both international and domestic refugee law.
A third argument for according refugee status to environmentally
displaced persons calls for amending the refugee definition to reduce the
ambiguity of both international and U.S. refugee law. Unlike the admis-
sion of migrants, the admission of refugees often sends a strong foreign
policy message to the state from which the refugees come. Accepting
refugees can send a particularly hostile message when that acceptance is
based on a condition that the state of origin can, but will not, remedy -
such as political or religious persecution. These foreign policy consider-
121 See id. at 518.
122 See S. REP. No. 96-256 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141.
123 Id. at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 146.
124 Id.
125 Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 766
(1998).
126 Id at 766-77.
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ations, in turn, are often inextricably linked with domestic interests -
such as the desire to appease nations from whom the United States seeks
economic or political cooperation. Arguably, while the language and
legislative history of the Refugee Act indicate a humanitarian focus,
practice suggests that U.S. refugee admissions have, instead, been driven
far more by these foreign policy and domestic interests.
For example, Central American aliens have traditionally gained lit-
tle U.S. sympathy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), under pressure from the State Department, maintains a presump-
tion that Salvadoran refugees are primarily economic immigrants and,
thus, ineligible for relief.'2 7 Meanwhile, since glasnost and the subse-
quent changes in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. has generously ac-
cepted ex-Soviet refugees. 12 8 In 1990 the United States accepted 40,000
Soviets who were not outside of the country of their nationality, who
were not displaced by war or civil strife and who, in many cases, did not
meet the U.N. definition of a refugee as contained in the Refugee Act. 2 9
They were admitted to the United States "in response to domestic politi-
cal considerations, under new refugee profiles and studies and assump-
tions and presumptions."'' 30 Thus, despite Congress' elimination of
political language from the Refugee statute, foreign policy and domestic
political concerns continue to significantly influence the process of refu-
gee admissions. 131
This tendency toward politicking in refugee admissions is largely
made possible by the ambiguous language of the Refugee Act. Aside
from the requirements of "appropriate consultation" with Congress, 32
the Refugee Act establishes few restrictions or guidelines for the Execu-
tive and Attorney General to follow when they exercise their "discretion"
in determining refugee admissions. 133 Thus, there are no clear standards
binding U.S. authorities to make refugee admissions consistent with the
original purpose of the refugee system - that is, to provide refuge to
those who cannot find protection under their own governments. In the
absence of a clear statutory mandate, even the standards to which the
executive and administrative agencies are ordinarily held do little to
check the decision-making process, other than provide a cause of action
127 See Knobelsdorff, supra note 15, at 659 (citing Jeffrey L. Romig, Comment, Salvado-
ran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 295,
315 (1985), which suggests that the United States' friendly relationship with El Salvador is the
reason that the U.S. fails to acknowledge that large numbers of Salvadoran refugees face per-
secution upon return to their homeland).
128 See 136 CONG. REC. S7711-01 (daily ed. June 1, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Knobelsdorff, supra note 15, at 659.
132 See supra note 34.
133 See INA § 207, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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against the U.S. government - an avenue not readily available to most
migrants seeking refugee status. If refugee law does not explicitly ac-
cord refugee status to victims of environmental disaster, tens of
thousands of such victims each year may be denied refugee status despite
the fact that thousands of others arguably less in need of international
protection are granted refugee protection, based on considerations wholly
inconsistent with the purposes of refugee law.
Finally, victims of man-made environmental disasters should be
able to seek refuge in other states for humanitarian reasons. Those who
flee their homes and often their countries because of such disasters as
Chernobyl and Bhopal are victims of environmental injustice 134 because
they lack the political power to protect their environment. One scholar
has argued that these victims therefore fit within the already existing
1951 refugee definition because they are members of a "social group"
lacking the political power to protect their environment.1 35 This argu-
ment is problematic, however, because it stretches the terms of the 1951
definition by distorting the concept of a "social group,"1 36 and by assert-
ing that by virtue of this characteristic these persons are "persecuted" by
their governments. 37 Victims of environmental catastrophes are often
politically disempowered. But that does not make them a "social group,"
for such disempowerment is unrelated to any characteristic other than the
nearly universal characteristic of being a person under an undemocratic
government. And it does not establish that they are "persecuted" for rea-
sons of their membership in a social group, because there is no specific
reason for which they are distinguished and oppressed. The "refugee"
definition, therefore, does not include these victims under its terms, de-
spite the fact that they are involuntarily displaced and no more able to
seek the protection of their governments than are political or religious
refugees.
134 Environmental justice is an emerging movement in the United States that emphasizes
equal enforcement of environmental laws among all communities regardless of race, ethnicity,
class, or any other category, and the right of all communities to participate in the decision-
making processes that shape environmental policies. See generally Alice Kaswan, Environ-
mental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L.
REV. 221 (1997).
135 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 526.
136 See Thomas, supra note 8, at 812-13 (quoting the UNHCR Handbook as stating "that
'[a] particular social group' normally comprises persons of similar background, habits or so-
cial status .... Thus, the United Nations has determined that one can be persecuted because of
both immutable characteristics (background and social status) and characteristics which one
should not be forced to change (habits).").
137 See Steinbock, supra note 125, at 758 (indicating that the plain meaning of "persecu-
tion" indicates that it involves "the infliction of harm on others because of their perceived
difference." The development of the modem concept of refugeehood confirms this
interpretation.).
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Several international instruments have established a fundamental
right to life and prohibited the intentional deprivation of life. The Uni-
versal Declaration for Human Rights states that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty, and security of person."' 138 The International Human
Rights Committee has clarified that right by declaring that "a state's fail-
ure to take appropriate measures to prevent the disappearance and killing
of an individual violates the right to life under Article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."' 39 This affirmative duty
of states to protect the right to life should logically apply to "circum-
stances in which a state's activities pose life-threatening environmental
risks." 40 Environmental threats may also violate other human rights,
such as the rights to health, livelihood, culture, privacy, and property -
rights embodied in international instruments such as the Universal Decla-
ration, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and ar-
guably in customary international law. 141 Neither international human
rights bodies nor other tribunals, however, have determined the content
or limits of these rights. 142
The United States has, at least in rhetoric, committed itself to up-
holding these international human rights. Recognizing that the past
serves as a guide to interpreting the refugee definition, a 1979 Senate
report on the Refugee Act noted that the United States has admitted refu-
gees, among other domestic and foreign policy reasons, "to respond to
human rights concerns embodied in the Universal Declaration for Human
Rights."' 43 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, although
only in dicta, that the central theme of United States refugee legislation is
"the creation of a haven for the world's homeless people," not simply the
maintenance of a preference for people who at one time had to flee per-
secution.1 44 Persons fleeing environmental disasters not of their own
making are certainly deprived of their homes, and their lives are
threatened, in a way at least as devastating and inescapable as political,
religious or ethnic persecution. If these humanitarian principles underlay
U.S. refugee laws, as legislative history indicates, then it is the United
States' duty to encourage the international community to take in as refu-
138 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3, G.A.Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
139 Michelle Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environ-
mental Abuse, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 355, 362 (1993). Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states that "[elvery human being has the inherent right to life ....
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1966)).
140 Schwartz, supra note 139, at 362-63.
141 See id. at 366.
142 Id.
143 S. REP. No. 96-256, at 6, (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 146-47.
144 Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971).
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gees those who flee from man-made environmental disasters that render
them homeless.
Major hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes undoubtedly necessitate
an international humanitarian response. But such disasters differ from
the types of environmental tragedies that occurred in Chernobyl and that
continue to occur in Southeast Asia, for they are not directly caused by
state action. An expansion in the definition of "refugee" may not be the
most effective approach to these situations, for in the aftermath of such
disasters the international response must include humanitarian aid and
assistance in rebuilding the damaged infrastructures, where possible.
Simply opening foreign doors to an increased number of the victims does
not, in the long run, help the devastated regions. Man-made environmen-
tal disasters, on the other hand, constitute human rights violations where
they are caused or condoned by government action. If the current lan-
guage of international and domestic refugee law does not recognize vic-
tims of such disasters as refugees, modern circumstances necessitate a
revision of the language to bring refugee law into compliance with inter-
national human rights agreements.
V. POLICY PROPOSAL
Refugee status under the INA for persons displaced by man-made
environmental disasters may therefore be the first step in according these
victims much-needed international recognition. U.S. refugee law, how-
ever, should be held to a standard independent from the "discretion" of
the Executive and the Attorney General - such as to an international
standard that will be binding on all U.N. member states. This paper pro-
poses revising international and U.S. refugee law to include in the defini-
tion of "refugee" any person: (1) whose country of nationality is
rendered unlivable due to an environmental disaster caused or condoned
by the state, "unlivable" being defined by the standards for the right to
life under the Universal Declaration and other international instruments
and norms that bind a significant number of states; and (2) who is unable
to seek protection from the government of that state, due either to the
government's inability or unwillingness to render effective protection,
(3) where the United Nations General Assembly, 45 upon appropriate
consultation, determines that circumstances in the country of origin can-
not be improved to a "livable" condition within a specified number of
years, such time period to be determined by the General Assembly at the
time of amending the definition. "Appropriate consultation" should in-
145 The U.N. General Assembly is charged with the responsibility to "initiate studies and
make recommendations for the purpose of . . . promoting international co-operation in the
economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all..." U.N. CHARTER art. 13 91 1.
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clude recommendations from both the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), 146 both of which would assess global refugee and
environmental situations and recommend specific measures to the Gen-
eral Assembly. The key terms of this new refugee definition should also
be set by the General Assembly through this process of consultation with
authoritative U.N. organs.
Arguably, by subjecting the United States to standards set by inter-
national organs, such a law could infringe upon the powers conferred on
the Legislative and Executive branches by Articles 1147 and 11148 of the
Constitution. This potential problem can be avoided, however, if the
standard is ratified by the United States as an international treaty, with
the reservation that the United States refuses to be bound by any provi-
sion that causes it to act contrary to the U.S. Constitution. Granted, the
United States could proclaim in almost any case that a decision under
this standard is unconstitutional because it infringes upon U.S. legislative
or executive powers. But as with all international agreements, foreign
policy considerations would provide the incentive for adherence to the
provisions of the treaty. The United States would exercise its option to
reject the treaty's provisions only as a last resort, as such a step could
significantly affect the United States' relations with the international
community. Thus, the United States would not be bound to any agree-
ment that violates the Constitution, yet important foreign policy consid-
erations would also prevent it from disregarding the agreed-upon
standard except in the most pressing circumstances - those considera-
tions significant enough to call for international attention. Under such an
international standard, refugee status would be determined in a far more
objective manner than under the current system, which grants each state
broad latitude to define and apply the ambiguous terms of the interna-
tional refugee definition in accordance with its own domestic or diplo-
matic interests.
146 The United Nations is compromised of six principal organs: a General Assembly, a
Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International
Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. U.N. CHARTER art. 7 1. The UNHCR and the UNEP are
subsidiary organs established under the Charter's provision authorizing the creation of "[s]uch
subsidiary organs as may be found necessary . . .in accordance with the present Charter."
U.N. CHARTER art. 7 2.
147 "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
148 "[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties .. . [and] appoint Ambassadors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The lan-
guage has been construed to give the Executive plenary power over all foreign relations mat-
ters, including immigration to the United States.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We are no longer living in a Cold War. Persecution of various so-
cial groups persists in many parts of the world, and those caught within
these situations undoubtedly deserve international aid. But to offer refu-
gee status only to those who can prove their lives are in danger due to the
social group to which they belong or the worldview which they hold is to
suggest that only membership in specific groups and freedom of opinion
or belief are fundamental human rights deserving of global protection. It
disregards the fundamental right that all human beings have to live in an
environment free from perils caused by human irresponsibility. Where a
government facilitates or condones the creation of such environmental
crises, human rights are at stake and the victims are entitled to flee else-
where as refugees. Without this designation of "refugee" in international
law, countries are not required to apply the principle of non-refoule-
ment 149 and environmental migrants can always be forced back to areas
where their lives are endangered.
A policy of recognizing "environmental refugees" will channel in-
ternational efforts toward dealing with the root causes of migration. 150 It
will compel those nations with the power to influence activities affecting
the environment to make not just economic and political decisions, but
decisions that will benefit the global environment as well. The current
legal system in the United States gives the President and the Attorney
General broad powers to admit or exclude the victims of environmental
disasters based on "humanitarian considerations" and the "national inter-
est." These terms, however lofty they may sound, are an invitation for
shrewd political decisionmaking and leveraging whenever U.S. interests
are at stake. There is no check on the admission process, other than what
consultation is considered to be "appropriate" at the moment. Notwith-
standing the Executive's broad powers to determine immigration matters
in the national interest, such powers do not explain a ratification of the
1967 Protocol that is void of any commitment.
Undoubtedly, the refugee burden should be shared by the entire in-
ternational community, not by the United States alone. But as interna-
tional agreements are effective only insofar as they are upheld under
domestic laws, the United States would do well to set an example by
recognizing that such persons are entitled to the aid of the international
community. Such a step would encourage the United Nations to revise
the mid-century definition of refugee and set a new international standard
for refugee protection that will address the most pressing needs of the
day. Broadly stated, refugee recognition is premised upon an interna-
149 See Martin, supra note 9.
150 See Plummer, supra note 57.
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tional agreement to protect those who are forced out of their homelands
due to injustices created or condoned by their governments. If this is the
underlying principle, then persons displaced from their home countries
due to man-made environmental disaster are entitled to international rec-
ognition as refugees.
